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Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States
(06-1195); (06-1196)
Ruling Below: (Boudemiene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert denied 127 S.Ct. 1748,
167 L.Ed.2d 578, 75 USLW 3528 [2007], cert granted 127 S.Ct. 3078, 75 USLW 3644 [2007]).
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay filed habeas corpus petitions along with other non-habeas claims in
federal court. The District Courts dismissed the habeas petitions, determining that no U.S. Court
could grant habeas relief to the detainees. Congress responded to the situation by passing the
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which effectively denied all U.S. Courts jurisdiction over
Guantanamo detainees. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did not
remove jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed before the enactment of the DTA. Congress again
responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, revoking jurisdiction over cases still
pending at the time of enactment, which the D.C. Circuit held applied to the original detainee cases
(the Odah and Boumediene cases). The Supreme Court, on April 2, 2007, denied certiorari on the
grounds that other remedies were not yet exhausted. On June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court changed
its mind and granted certiorari to the consolidated Odah and Boumediene cases.
Question Presented: Whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) validly deprived the
courts of jurisdiction to consider the habeas claims of Guantanamo Bay detainees and, if so,
whether the MCA is constitutional.
Lakhdar BOUMEDIENE, Detainee, Camp Delta, et al., Appellants
V.
George W. BUSH, President of the United States, et al., Appellees
Khaled A.F. Al Odah, Next Friend of Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah et al.,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants
It.
United States of America, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided February 20, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge. recurring subject of legislation and litigation.
In these consolidated appeals, foreign
Do federal courts have jurisdiction over nationals held at Guantanamo filed petitions
petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by for writs of habeas corpus alleging violations
aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy of the Constitution. treaties. statutes,
combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval regulations, the common law, and the law of
Base in Cuba? The question has been the nations. Some detainees also raised non-
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habeas claims under the federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Alien Tort
Act, id. § 1350. In the "Al Odah" cases (Nos.
05-5064, 05-5095 through 05-5116), which
consist of eleven cases involving fifty-six
detainees, Judge Green denied the
government's motion to dismiss with respect
to the claims arising from alleged violations
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and the Third Geneva Convention, but
dismissed all other claims. After Judge Green
certified the order for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the government
appealed and the detainees cross-appealed. In
the "Boumediene" cases (Nos. 05-5062 and
05-5063)-two cases involving seven
detainees-Judge Leon granted the
government's motion and dismissed the cases
in their entirety.
In the two years since the district court's
decisions the law has undergone several
changes. As a result, we have had two oral
arguments and four rounds of briefing in these
cases during that period. The developments
that have brought us to this point are as
follows.
In Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2003), we affirmed the district
court's dismissal of various claims-habeas
and non-habeas-raised by Guantanamo
detainees. With respect to the habeas claims.,
we held that "no court in this country has
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief, under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, to the Guantanamo detainees."
321 F.3d at 1141. The habeas statute then
stated that "Writs of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions." 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2004). Because
Guantanamo Bay was not part of the
sovereign territory of the United States, but
rather land the United States leases from
Cuba. we determined it was not within the
"respective jurisdictions" of the district court
or any other court in the United States. We
therefore held that § 2241 did not provide
statutory jurisdiction to consider habeas relief
for any alien-enemy or not-held at
Guantanamo. Regarding the non-habeas
claims, we noted that "'the privilege of
litigation' does not extend to aliens in military
custody who have no presence in 'any
territory over which the United States is
sovereign,"' id. at 1144, and held that the
district court properly dismissed those claims.
The Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d
548 (2004), holding that the habeas statute
extended to aliens at Guantanamo. Although
the detainees themselves were beyond the
district court's jurisdiction, the Court
determined that the district court's jurisdiction
over the detainees' custodians was sufficient
to provide subject-matter jurisdiction under §
2241. The Court further held that the district
court had jurisdiction over the detainees' non-
habeas claims because nothing in the federal
question statute or the Alien Tort Act
categorically excluded aliens outside the
United States from bringing such claims. The
Court remanded the cases to us, and we
remanded them to the district court.
In the meantime Congress responded with the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) (DTA), which
the President signed into law on December
30. 2005. The DTA added a subsection (e) to
the habeas statute. This new provision stated
that, "[e]xcept as provided in section 1005 of
the [DTA], no court, justice, or judge" may
exercise jurisdiction over
(1) an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the
Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
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(2) any other action against the
United States or its agents relating
to any aspect of the detention by the
Department of Defense of an alien
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who
(A) is currently in military
custody; or
(B) has been determined by
the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit . . . to
have been properly
detained as an enemy
combatant.
DTA § 1005(e)(1) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The "except as provided" referred to
subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) of section 1005
of the DTA, which provided for exclusive
judicial review of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal determinations and military
commission decisions in the D.C. Circuit.
The following June, the Supreme Court
decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, - U.S. -, 126
S.Ct. 2749, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006). Among
other things, the Court held that the DTA did
not strip federal courts of jurisdiction over
habeas cases pending at the time of the
DTA's enactment. The Court pointed to a
provision of the DTA stating that subsections
(e)(2) and (e)(3) of section 1005 "shall apply
with respect to any claim . . . that is pending
on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act." DTA § 1005(h). In contrast, no
provision of the DTA stated whether
subsection (e)(1) applied to pending cases.
Finding that Congress "chose not to so
provide ... after having been presented with
the option," the Court concluded "[t]he
omission [wa]s an integral part of the
statutory scheme." Handan, 126 S.Ct. at
2769.
In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)(MCA),
which the President signed into law on
October 17, 2006. Section 7 of the MCA is
entitled "Habeas Corpus Matters." In
subsection (a), Congress again amended §
2241(e). The new amendment reads:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the United States
who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or
is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in [section
1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) of the DTA],
no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any
other action against the United
States or its agents relating to any
aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or
was detained by the United States
and has been determined by the
United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or
is awaiting such determination.
MCA § 7(a) (internal quotation
omitted). Subsection (b) states:
marks
The amendment made by
subsection (a) shall take effect on
the date of the enactment of this
Act, and shall apply to all cases,
without exception, pending on or
after the date of the enactment of
this Act which relate to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment,
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trial, or conditions of detention of
an alien detained by the United
States since September 11, 2001.
MCA § 7(b) (emphasis added).
The first question is whether the MCA applies
to the detainees' habeas petitions. If the MCA
does apply, the second question is whether the
statute is an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
I.
As to the application of the MCA to these
lawsuits, section 7(b) states that the
amendment to the habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e), "shall apply to all cases,
without exception, pending on or after the
date of the enactment" that relate to certain
subjects. The detainees' lawsuits fall within
the subject matter covered by the amended §
2241(e); each case relates to an "aspect" of
detention and each deals with the detention of
an "alien" after September 11, 2001. The
MCA brings all such "cases, without
exception" within the new law.
Everyone who has followed the interaction
between Congress and the Supreme Court
knows full well that one of the primary
purposes of the MCA was to overrule
Hamdan. Everyone, that is, except the
detainees. Their cases, they argue, are not
covered. The arguments are creative but not
cogent. To accept them would be to defy the
will of Congress. Section 7(b) could not be
clearer. It states that "the amendment made by
subsection (a)"-which repeals habeas
jurisdiction-applies to "all cases, without
exception" relating to any aspect of detention.
It is almost as if the proponents of these
words were slamming their fists on the table
shouting "When we say 'all,' we mean all-
without exception!"
The detainees of course do not see it that way.
They say Congress should have expressly
stated in section 7(b) that habeas cases were
included among "all cases, without exception,
pending on or after" the MCA became law.
Otherwise, the MCA does not represent an
"unambiguous statutory directive[ ]" to repeal
habeas corpus jurisdiction. INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d
347 (2001). This is nonsense. Section 7(b)
specifies the effective date of section 7(a).
The detainees' argument means that
Congress, in amending the habeas statute (28
U.S.C. § 2241), specified an effective date
only for non-habeas cases. Of course
Congress did nothing of the sort. Habeas
cases are simply a subset of cases dealing
with detention. Congress did not have to say
that "the amendment made by subsection
(a)"-which already expressly includes
habeas cases-shall take effect on the date of
enactment and shall apply to "all cases,
without exception, including habeas cases."
The St. Cyr rule of interpretation the detainees
invoke demands clarity, not redundancy.
The detainees also ask us to compare the
language of section 7(b) to that of section 3 of
the MCA. Section 3. entitled "Military
Commissions," creates jurisdiction in the
D.C. Circuit for review of military
commission decisions, see 10 U.S.C. § 950g.
It then adds 10 U.S.C. § 950j, which deals
with the finality of military commission
decisions. Section 950j strips federal courts of
jurisdiction over any pending or future cases
that would involve review of such decisions:
Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter and notwithstanding any
other provision of law (including
section 2241 of title 28 or any other
habeas corpus provision). no court,
justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any
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claim or cause of action
whatsoever, including any action
pending on or filed after the date of
the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, relating
to the prosecution, trial, or
judgment of a military commission
under this chapter, including
challenges to the lawfulness of
procedures of military commissions
under this chapter.
10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) (emphasis added). The
detainees maintain that § 950j calls into
question Congress's intention to apply section
7(b) to pending habeas cases.
The argument goes nowhere. Section 7(b),
read in conjunction with section 7(a), is no
less explicit than § 950j. Section 7(a) strips
jurisdiction over detainee cases, including
habeas cases, and section 7(b) makes section
7(a) applicable to pending cases. Section 950j
accomplishes the same thing, but in one
sentence. A drafting decision to separate
section 7 into two subsections-one
addressing the scope of the jurisdictional bar,
the other addressing how the bar applies to
pending cases-makes no legal difference.
II.
This brings us to the constitutional issue:
whether the MCA, in depriving the courts of
jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas
petitions, violates the Suspension Clause of
the Constitution, which states that "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."
The Supreme Court has stated the Suspension
Clause protects the writ "as it existed in
1789," when the first Judiciary Act created
the federal courts and granted jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus. [The court
looked at three common-law cases cited by
the detainees to argue that the writ of habeas
corpus should be extended to aliens outside
the sovereign's territory. In none of those
cases were the aliens outside the territory.]
[The court traced historical precedents from
English law regarding writs of habeas corpus
and concluded that in 1789, habeas corpus
would not have been available to aliens
without presence or property within the
United States.]
. . . Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763. 70
S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), ends any
doubt about the scope of common law habeas.
"We are cited to no instance where a court, in
this or any other country where the writ is
known, has issued it on behalf of an alien
enemy who, at no relevant time and in no
stage of his captivity, has been within its
territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of
the Constitution extends such a right, nor does
anything in our statutes." Id. at 768, 70 S.Ct.
936....
The detainees encounter another difficulty
with their Suspension Clause claim. Precedent
in this court and the Supreme Court holds that
the Constitution does not confer rights on
aliens without property or presence within the
United States. As we explained in Al Odah,
321 F.3d at 1140-41, the controlling case is
Johnson v. Eisentrager. There twenty-one
German nationals confined in custody of the
U.S. Army in Germany filed habeas corpus
petitions. Although the German prisoners
alleged they were civilian agents of the
German government, a military commission
convicted them of war crimes arising from
military activity against the United States in
China after Germany's surrender. They
claimed their convictions and imprisonment
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violated various constitutional provisions and
the Geneva Conventions. The Supreme Court
rejected the proposition "that the Fifth
Amendment confers rights upon all persons,
whatever their nationality, wherever they are
located and whatever their offenses," 339
U.S. at 783, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Court
continued: "If the Fifth Amendment confers
its rights on all the world . .. [it] would mean
that during military occupation irreconcilable
enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and
'werewolves' could require the American
Judiciary to assure them freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly as in the First
Amendment, right to bear arms as in the
Second, security against 'unreasonable'
searches and seizures as in the Fourth, as well
as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments." Id. at 784, 70 S.Ct. 936.
(Shortly before Germany's surrender, the
Nazis began training covert forces called
''werewolves" to conduct terrorist activities
during the Allied occupation. See http://
www. archives. gov/ iwg/
declassifiedrecords/ossrecords_263_wilhel
m hoettl.html.)
Later Supreme Court decisions have followed
Eisentrager. In 1990, for instance, the Court
stated that Eisentrager "rejected the claim
that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment
rights outside the sovereign territory of the
United States." United States i. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269, 110 S.Ct. 1056,
108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). After describing the
facts of Eisentrager and quoting from the
opinion, the Court concluded that with respect
to aliens. "our rejection of extraterritorial
application of the Fifth Amendment was
emphatic." Id. By analogy, the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment did not protect
nonresident aliens against unreasonable
searches or seizures conducted outside the
sovereign territory of the United States. Citing
Eisentrager again, the Court explained that to
extend the Fourth Amendment to aliens
abroad "would have significant and
deleterious consequences for the United
States in conducting activities beyond its
boundaries," particularly since the
government "frequently employs Armed
Forces outside this country," id. at 273, 110
S.Ct. 1056. A decade after Verdugo- Urquidez,
the Court-again citing Eisentrager-found it
"well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the
United States are unavailable to aliens outside
of our geographic borders." Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491,
150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).
Any distinction between the naval base at
Guantanamo Bay and the prison in
Landsberg, Germany, where the petitioners in
Eisentrager were held, is immaterial to the
application of the Suspension Clause. The
United States occupies the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base under an indefinite lease it
entered into in 1903. The text of the lease and
decisions of circuit courts and the Supreme
Court all make clear that Cuba-not the
United States-has sovereignty over
Guantanamo Bay....
The detainees cite the Insular Cases in which
"fundamental personal rights" extended to
U.S. territories. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298, 312-13, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627
(1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138,
148, 24 S.Ct. 808, 49 L.Ed. 128 (1904); see
also Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir.
1977). But in each of those cases., Congress
had exercised its power under Article IV.
Section 3 of the Constitution to regulate
"Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States," U.S. CONST., art. IV. § 3, cl.
2. These cases do not establish anything
regarding the sort of defacto sovereignty the
detainees say exists at Guantanamo. Here
Congress and the President have specifically
disclaimed the sort of territorial jurisdiction
they asserted in Puerto Rico, the
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Philippines, and Guam.
Precedent in this circuit also forecloses the
detainees' claims to constitutional rights. In
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C.
Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Christopher v. Harbuiy, 536 U.S. 403, 122
S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002), we
quoted extensively from Verdugo-Urquidez
and held that the Court's description of
Eisentrager was "firm and considered dicta
that binds this court." Other decisions of this
court are firmer still. Citing Eisentrager, we
held in Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252,
254 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam), that
"non-resident aliens ... plainly cannot appeal
to the protection of the Constitution or laws of
the United States." The law of this circuit is
that a "foreign entity without property or
presence in this country has no constitutional
rights, under the due process clause or
otherwise." People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran
v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
[The court questioned the dissent's eagerness
to distinguish the Suspension Clause from
other rights afforded by the Bill of Rights.
The court saw no fundamental difference
between the right of habeas corpus and other
individual rights.]
The unstated assumption must be that the
reasoning of our decisions and the Supreme
Court's in denying constitutional rights to
aliens outside the United States would not
apply if a constitutional provision could be
characterized as protecting something other
than a "right." On this theory, for example,
aliens outside the United States are entitled to
the protection of the Separation of Powers
because they have no individual rights under
the Separation of Powers. Where the dissent
gets this strange idea is a mystery, as is the
reasoning behind it.
III.
Federal courts have no jurisdiction in these
cases. In supplemental briefing after
enactment of the DTA, the government asked
us not only to decide the habeas jurisdiction
question, but also to review the merits of the
detainees' designation as enemy combatants
by their Combatant Status Review Tribunals.
The detainees objected to converting their
habeas appeals to appeals from their
Tribunals. In briefs filed after the DTA
became law and after the Supreme Court
decided Hamdan, they argued that we were
without authority to do so. Even if we have
authority to convert the habeas appeals over
the petitioners' objections, the record does not
have sufficient information to perform the
review the DTA allows. Our only recourse is
to VACATE the district courts' decisions and
DISMISS the cases for lack of jurisdiction.
So ordered.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I can join neither the reasoning of the court
nor its conclusion that the federal courts lack
power to consider the detainees' petitions.
While I agree that Congress intended to
withdraw federal jurisdiction through the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 ("MCA"), the
court's holding that the MCA is consistent
with the Suspension Clause of Article I,
section 9, of the Constitution does not
withstand analysis. By concluding that this
court must reject "the detainees' claims to
constitutional rights," Op. at 992, the court
fundamentally misconstrues the nature of
suspension: Far from conferring an individual
right that might pertain only to persons
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substantially connected to the United States,
the Suspension Clause is a limitation on the
powers of Congress. Consequently, it is only
by misreading the historical record and
ignoring the Supreme Court's well-considered
and binding dictum in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 481-82, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548
(2004), that the writ at common law would
have extended to the detainees, that the court
can conclude that neither this court nor the
district courts have jurisdiction to consider the
detainees' habeas claims.
A review of the text and operation of the
Suspension Clause shows that, by nature, it
operates to constrain the powers of Congress.
Prior to the enactment of the MCA, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the
detainees held at Guantanamo had a statutory
right to habeas corpus. Rasul, 542 U.S. at
483-84. 124 S.Ct. 2686. The MCA purports to
withdraw that right but does so in a manner
that offends the constitutional constraint on
suspension. The Suspension Clause limits the
removal of habeas corpus, at least as the writ
was understood at common law, to times of
rebellion or invasion unless Congress
provides an adequate alternative remedy. The
writ would have reached the detainees at
common law, and Congress has neither
provided an adequate alternative remedy,
through the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
Pub.L. No. 109-148. Div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat.
2680, 2739 ("DTA"), nor invoked the
exception to the Clause by making the
required findings to suspend the writ. The
MCA is therefore void and does not deprive
this court or the district courts of jurisdiction.
On the merits of the detainees' appeal in
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311
(D.D.C.2005) and the cross-appeals in In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d
443 (D.D.C.2005), I would affirm in part in
Guantanamo Detainee Cases and reverse in
Khalid and remand the cases to the district
courts.
I.
In this Part, I address the nature of the
Suspension Clause, the retroactive effect of
Congress's recent enactment on habeas
corpus-the MCA-and conclude with an
assessment of the effect of the MCA in light
of the dictates of the Constitution.
A.
The court holds that Congress may suspend
habeas corpus as to the detainees because they
have no individual rights under the
Constitution. It is unclear where the court
finds that the limit on suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus is an individual
entitlement....
The other provisions of Article I, section 9,
indicate how to read the Suspension Clause.
The clause immediately following provides
that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed." The Supreme Court has
construed the Attainder Clause as establishing
a "category of Congressional actions which
the Constitution barred." United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315. 106 Ct.C1. 856, 66
S.Ct. 1073. 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946). In Lovett,
the Court dismissed the possibility that an Act
of Congress in violation of the Attainder
Clause was non-justiciable. remarking:
Our Constitution did not
contemplate such a result. To quote
Alexander Hamilton, * * * a limited
constitution * * * [is] one which
contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative
authority; such, for instance, as that
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it shall pass no bills of attainder, no
ex post facto laws, and the like.
Limitations of this kind can be
preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of the
courts of justice; whose duty it must
be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution
void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or
privileges would amount to nothing.
Id. at 314, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (quoting The
Federalist No. 78) (emphasis added)
(alteration and omissions in original). So too,
in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 &
n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981),
where the Court noted that the ban on ex post
facto legislation "restricts governmental
power by restraining arbitrary and potentially
vindictive legislation" and acknowledged that
the clause "confin[es] the legislature to penal
decisions with prospective effect." For like
reasons, any act in violation of the Suspension
Clause is void, cf Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316, 66
S.Ct. 1073, and cannot operate to divest a
court of jurisdiction.
The court dismisses the distinction between
individual rights and limitations on
Congress's powers. It chooses to make no
affirmative argument of its own, instead
hoping to rebut the sizable body of conflicting
authorities.
The court appears to believe that the
Suspension Clause is just like the
constitutional amendments that form the Bill
of Rights. It is a truism, of course, that
individual rights like those found in the first
ten amendments work to limit Congress.
However, individual rights are merely a
subset of those matters that constrain the
legislature. These two sets cannot be
understood as coextensive unless the court is
prepared to recognize such awkward
individual rights as Commerce Clause rights,
or the personal right not to have a bill raising
revenue that originates in the Senate.
That the Suspension Clause appears in Article
I, section 9, is not happenstance. . . . It is
implausible that the Framers would have
viewed the Suspension Clause, as the court
implies, as a budding Bill of Rights but would
not have assigned the provision its own
section of the Constitution, much as they did
with the only crime specified in the
document, treason, which appears alone in
Article III, section 3. Instead, the court must
treat the Suspension Clause's placement in
Article I, section 9, as a conscious
determination of a limit on Congress's
powers....
The court also alludes to the idea that the
Suspension Clause cannot apply to foreign
military conflicts because the exception
extends only to cases of "Rebellion or
Invasion." Op. at 992 n. 11. The Framers
understood that the privilege of the writ was
of such great significance that its suspension
should be strictly limited to circumstances
where the peace and security of the Nation
were jeopardized. ...
B.
This court would have jurisdiction to address
the detainees' claims but for Congress's
enactment of the MCA. . . . After Rasul,
Congress enacted the DTA. which purported
to deprive the federal courts of habeas
jurisdiction. DTA § 1005(e), 118 Stat. at
2741-43. The Supreme Court held in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2749,
2764-69, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006), however,
that the DTA does not apply retroactively,
and so it does not disturb this court's
jurisdiction over the instant appeals, which
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were already pending when the DTA became
law.
[Though not joining the majority's reasoning,
the dissent concluded similarly that Congress
intended to apply the MCA retroactively.]
C.
The question, then, is whether by attempting
to eliminate all federal court jurisdiction to
consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus,
Congress has overstepped the boundary
established by the Suspension Clause. The
Supreme Court has stated on several
occasions that "at the absolute minimum, the
Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it
existed in 1789."' St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301,
121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 663-64, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135
L.Ed.2d 827 (1996))(emphasis added).
Therefore, at least insofar as habeas corpus
exists and existed in 1789, Congress cannot
suspend the writ without providing an
adequate alternative except in the narrow
exception specified in the Constitution....
1.
Assessing the state of the law in 1789 is no
trivial feat, and the court's analysis today
demonstrates how quickly a few missteps can
obscure history....
To draw the ultimate conclusion as to whether
the writ at common law would have extended
to aliens under the control (if not within the
sovereign territory) of the Crown requires
piecing together the considerable
circumstantial evidence, a step that the court
is unwilling to take. Analysis of one of these
cases, the 1759 English case of Rex v.
Schiever, shows just how small this final
inference is. Barnard Schiever was the subject
of a neutral nation (Sweden), who was
detained by the Crown when England was at
war with France. He claimed that his
classification as a "prisoner of war" was
factually inaccurate, because he "was desirous
of entering into the service of the merchants
of England" until he was seized on the high
seas by a French privateer, which in turn was
captured by the British Navy. In an affidavit,
he swore that his French captor "detained
him[ ] against his will and inclination . .. and
treated him with so much severity[ ] that [his
captor] would not suffer him to go on shore
when in port ... but closely confined him to
duty [on board the ship]." Id. at 765-66, 97
Eng. Rep. at 551. The habeas court ultimately
determined, on the basis of Schiever's own
testimony, that he was properly categorized
and thus lawfully detained.
The court discounts Schiever because, after
England captured the French privateer while
en route to Norway, it was carried into
Liverpool, England, where Schiever was held
in the town jail. Id., 97 Eng. Rep. at 551. As
such, the case did not involve "an alien
outside the territory of the sovereign." Op. at
988-89. However, Schiever surely was not
voluntarily brought into England, so his mere
presence conferred no additional rights. As
the Supreme Court observed in Verdugo-
Urquidez, "involuntary [presence] is not the
sort to indicate any substantial connection
with our country." 494 U.S. at 271, 110 S.Ct.
1056. Any gap between Schiever and the
detainees' detention at Guantanamo Bay is
thus exceedingly narrow.
This court need not make the final inference.
It has already been made for us. In Rasul, the
Supreme Court stated that "[a]pplication of
the habeas statute to persons detained at the
[Guantanamo] base is consistent with the
historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus."
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542 U.S. at 481, 124 S.Ct. 2686. By reaching
a contrary conclusion, the court ignores the
settled principle that "carefully considered
language of the Supreme Court, even if
technically dictum, generally must be treated
as authoritative." Sierra Club v. EPA, 322
F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003)(quoting
United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 153
(D.C. Cir. 1997))(internal quotation marks
omitted). Even setting aside this principle, the
court offers no convincing analysis to compel
the contrary conclusion. The court makes
three assertions: First, Lord Mansfield's
opinion in Rex v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 97 Eng.
Rep. 587 (K.B.1759), disavows the right
claimed by the detainees. Second, it would
have been impractical for English courts to
extend the writ extraterritorially. Third,
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70
S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), is
controlling. None of these assertions
withstands scrutiny.
In Cowle, Lord Mansfield wrote that "[t]here
is no doubt as to the power of this Court;
where the place is under the subjection of the
Crown of England; the only question is, as to
the propriety." 2 Burr. at 856, 97 Eng. Rep. at
599. He noted thereafter, by way of
qualification, that the writ would not extend
"[]o foreign dominions, which belong to a
prince who succeeds to the throne of
England." Id., 97 Eng. Rep. at 599-600. [The
dissent explained that "foreign dominions" in
this context did not mean a foreign country,
but instead a country that used to be under
foreign control and now was under England's
sovereignty. It also noted that it had nothing
to do with extraterritoriality, because habeas
was unnecessary for territories controlled by
princes in the line of succession, which had
independent court systems.] In the modern-
day parallel, where a suitable alternative for
habeas exists, the writ need not extend. The
relationship between England and
principalities was the only instance where it
was "found necessary to restrict the scope of
the writ." 9 William Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 124 (1938). Cowle, by its plain
language, then, must be read as recognizing
that the writ of habeas corpus ran even to
places that were "no part of the realm," where
the Crown's other writs did not run, nor did
its laws apply. 2 Burr. at 835-36, 853-55, 97
Eng. Rep. at 587-88, 598-99. The Supreme
Court has adopted this logical reading. See
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481-82, 124 S.Ct. 2686.
The court next disposes of Cowle and the
historical record by suggesting that the
"power" to issue the writ acknowledged by
Lord Mansfield can be explained by the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2.
See Op. at 989. The Supreme Court has stated
that the Habeas Corpus Act "enforces the
common law," Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 193, 202, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830), thus
hardly suggesting that the "power" recognized
by Lord Mansfield was statutory and not
included within the 1789 scope of the
common-law writ. To the extent that the court
makes the curious argument that the Habeas
Corpus Act would have made it too
impractical to produce prisoners if applied
extraterritorially because it imposed fines on
jailers who did not quickly produce the body,
Op. at 989-90, the court cites no precedent
that suggests that "practical problems"
eviscerate "the precious safeguard of personal
liberty [for which] there is no higher duty
than to maintain it unimpaired," Bowen v.
Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26, 59 S.Ct. 442. 83
L.Ed. 455 (1939). This line of reasoning
employed by the court fails for two main
reasons:
First, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was
expressly limited to those who "have beene
committed for criminall or supposed criminall
Matters." 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 1. Hence, the
burden of expediency imposed by the Act
could scarcely have prevented common-law
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courts from exercising habeas jurisdiction in
non-criminal matters such as the petitions in
these appeals. Statutory habeas in English
courts did not extend to non-criminal
detention until the Habeas Corpus Act of
1816, 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, although courts
continued to exercise their common-law
powers in the interim. See 2 Chambers, supra,
at 11; 9 Holdsworth, supra, at 121.
Second, there is ample evidence that the writ
did issue to faraway lands....
Finally, the court reasons that Eisentrager
requires the conclusion that there is no
constitutional right to habeas for those in the
detainees' posture. See Op. at 990-91. In
Eisentrager, the detainees claimed that they
were "entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue
in some court of the United States for a writ
of habeas corpus." 339 U.S. at 777, 70 S.Ct.
936. Thus Eisentrager presented a far
different question than confronts this court.
The detainees do not here contend that the
Constitution accords them a positive right to
the writ but rather that the Suspension Clause
restricts Congress's power to eliminate a
preexisting statutory right. To answer that
question does not entail looking to the extent
of the detainees' ties to the United States but
rather requires understanding the scope of the
writ of habeas corpus at common law in 1789.
The court's reliance on Eisentrager is
misplaced.
This brings me to the question of whether.
absent the writ. Congress has provided an
adequate alternative procedure for
challenging detention. If it so chooses,
Congress may replace the privilege of habeas
corpus with a commensurate procedure
without overreaching its constitutional ambit.
However, as the Supreme Court has
cautioned. if a subject of Executive detention
"were subject to any substantial procedural
hurdles which ma[k]e his remedy . . . less
swift and imperative than federal habeas
corpus, the gravest constitutional doubts
would be engendered [under the Suspension
Clause]." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 14, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963).
[The dissent looked at three occasions on
which the Supreme Court held habeas corpus
replacements to be adequate and determined
that none helped the government's argument.]
These cases provide little cover for the
government. As the Supreme Court has
stated, "[a]t its historical core, the writ of
habeas corpus has served as a means of
reviewing the legality of Executive detention,
and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest." St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at
301, 121 S.Ct. 2271. With this in mind, the
government is mistaken in contending that the
combatant status review tribunals ("CSRTs")
established by the DTA suitably test the
legitimacy of Executive detention. Far from
merely adjusting the mechanism for
vindicating the habeas right, the DTA
imposes a series of hurdles while saddling
each Guantanamo detainee with an assortment
of handicaps that make the obstacles
insurmountable.
At the core of the Great Writ is the ability to
"inquire into illegal detention with a view to
an order releasing the petitioner." Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827,
36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)(internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). An
examination of the CSRT procedure and this
court's CSRT review powers reveals that
these alternatives are neither adequate to test
whether detention is unlawful nor directed
toward releasing those who are unlawfully
held.
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"Petitioners in habeas corpus proceedings ...
are entitled to careful consideration and
plenary processing of their claims including
full opportunity for the presentation of the
relevant facts." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 298, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281
(1969). The offerings of CSRTs fall far short
of this mark. Under the common law, when a
detainee files a habeas petition, the burden
shifts to the government to justify the
detention in its return of the writ. When not
facing an imminent trial, the detainee then
must be afforded an opportunity to traverse
the writ, explaining why the grounds for
detention are inadequate in fact or in law. A
CSRT works quite differently. The detainee
bears the burden of coming forward with
evidence explaining why he should not be
detained. The detainee need not be informed
of the basis for his detention (which may be
classified), need not be allowed to introduce
rebuttal evidence (which is sometimes
deemed by the CSRT too impractical to
acquire), and must proceed without the
benefit of his own counsel. Moreover, these
proceedings occur before a board of military
judges subject to command influence. Insofar
as each of these practices impedes the process
of determining the true facts underlying the
lawfulness of the challenged detention, they
are inimical to the nature of habeas review.
This court's review of CSRT determinations
is not designed to cure these inadequacies.
This court may review only the record
developed by the CSRT to assess whether the
CSRT has complied with its own standards.
Because a detainee still has no means to
present evidence rebutting the government's
case-even assuming the detainee could learn
of its contents-assessing whether the
government has more evidence in its favor
than the detainee is hardly the proper antidote.
The fact that this court also may consider
whether the CSRT process "is consistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United
States," DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii), 119 Stat. at
2742, does not obviate the need for habeas.
Whereas a cognizable constitutional,
statutory, or treaty violation could defeat the
lawfulness of the government's cause for
detention, the writ issues whenever the
Executive lacks a lawful justification for
continued detention. The provisions of DTA §
1005(e)(2) cannot be reconciled with the
purpose of habeas corpus, as they handcuff
attempts to combat "the great engines of
judicial despotism," The Federalist No. 83, at
456 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed.
1898).
Additionally, and more significant still,
continued detention may be justified by a
CSRT on the basis of evidence resulting from
torture. Testimony procured by coercion is
notoriously unreliable and unspeakably
inhumane. . . . The DTA implicitly endorses
holding detainees on the basis of such
evidence by including an anti-torture
provision that applies only to future CSRTs.
DTA § 1005(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 2741. Even
for these future proceedings, however, the
Secretary of Defense is required only to
develop procedures to assess whether
evidence obtained by torture is probative, not
to require its exclusion.
Even if the CSRT protocol were capable of
assessing whether a detainee was unlawfully
held and entitled to be released, it is not an
adequate substitute for the habeas writ
because this remedy is not guaranteed. Upon
concluding that detention is unjustified, a
habeas court "can only direct [the prisoner] to
be discharged." Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at
136; see also 2 STORY, supra, § 1339. But
neither the DTA nor the MCA require this,
and a recent report studying CSRT records
shows that when at least three detainees were
found by CSRTs not to be enemy combatants,
they were subjected to a second, and in one
case a third. CSRT proceeding until they were
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finally found to be properly classified as
enemy combatants.
3.
Therefore, because Congress in enacting the
MCA has revoked the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus where it would have issued
under the common law in 1789. without
providing an adequate alternative, the MCA is
void unless Congress's action fits within the
exception in the Suspension Clause: Congress
may suspend the writ "when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
However, Congress has not invoked this
power.
[The dissent noted the four rare occasions on
which Congress saw fit to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.]
Because the MCA contains neither of these
hallmarks of suspension, and because there is
no indication that Congress sought to avail
itself of the exception in the Suspension
Clause, its attempt to revoke federal
jurisdiction that the Supreme Court held to
exist exceeds the powers of Congress. The
MCA therefore has no effect on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to consider
these petitions and their related appeals.
II.
In In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355
F.Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C.2005), Judge Joyce
Hens Green addressed eleven coordinated
habeas cases involving 56 aliens being
detained by the United States as "enemy
combatants" at Guantanamo Bay, id. at 445.
These detainees are citizens of friendly
nations-Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Kuwait,
Libya. Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
Yemen-who were seized in Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Gambia,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Zambia. Each
detainee maintains that he was wrongly
classified as an "enemy combatant." Denying
in part the government's motion to dismiss
the petitions, the district court ruled:
[T]he petitioners have stated valid
claims under the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution
and . . . the procedures
implemented by the government to
confirm that the petitioners are
"enemy combatants" subject to
indefinite detention violate the
petitioners' rights to due process
of law.
Id. at 445. The district court further ruled that
the Taliban but not the al Qaeda detainees
were entitled to the protections of the Third
and Fourth Geneva Conventions. Id. at 478-
80.
In Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311
(D.D.C.2005), Judge Richard J. Leon
considered the habeas petitions of five
Algerian-Bosnian citizens and one Algerian
citizen with permanent Bosnian residency.
They were arrested by Bosnian police in 2001
on suspicion of plotting to attack the United
States and British embassies in Sarajevo.
After the Supreme Court of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina ordered the six men
to be released in January 2002, they were
seized by United States forces and transported
to Guantanamo Bay. The Khalid decision also
covers the separate case of a French citizen
seized in Pakistan and transported to
Guantanamo Bay. Rejecting the petitioners'
claim that their detention is unjustified, the
district court ruled that "no viable legal theory
exists by which [the district court] could issue
a writ of habeas corpus under" the
circumstances presented, id. at 314, noting the
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President's powers under Article II,
Congress's Authorization for the Use of
Military Force ("AUMF"'), and the Order on
Detention (Nov. 13, 2001), see id. at 317-20.
The district court granted the government's
motion and dismissed the petitions. Id. at 316.
The fundamental question presented by a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is whether
Executive detention is lawful. A far more
difficult question is what serves to justify
Executive detention under the law. At the
margin, the precise constitutional bounds of
Executive authority are unclear, and the
Executive detention at issue is the product of
a unique situation in our history. Unlike the
uniformed combat that is contemplated by the
laws of war, the Geneva Conventions, and the
Constitution, the United States confronts a
stateless enemy in the war on terror that is
difficult to identify and widely dispersed.
The parties recite in their several briefs the
substantial competing interests of individual
liberty and national security that are at stake,
much as did the Supreme Court in Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 529-32, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (plurality
opinion). In Hamdi, the plurality
acknowledged that "core strategic matters of
warmaking belong in the hands of those who
are best positioned and most politically
accountable for making them." Id. at 531, 124
S.Ct. 2633. At the same time. it
acknowledged that for Hamdi "detention
could last for the rest of his life." Id. at 520.
124 S.Ct. 2633. Although Hamdi was a
United States citizen, the premise underlying
the conclusion that there is a role for the
judiciary, id. at 532-33, 124 S.Ct. 2633. was
that "history and common sense teach us that
an unchecked system of detention carries the
potential to become a means for oppression
and abuse of others who do not present that
sort of threat.'" id. at 530, 124 S.Ct. 2633. In
short. the nature of the conflict makes true
enemies of the United States more
troublesome. At the same time, the risk of
wrongful detention of mere bystanders is
acute, particularly where, as here, the
Executive detains individuals without trial.
Parsing the role of the judiciary in this context
is arduous. The power of the President is at its
zenith, after all, when the President acts in the
conduct of foreign affairs with the support of
Congress. Even assuming the AUMF and the
Order on Detention provide such support for
the detentions at issue, still the President's
powers are not unlimited in wartime. . . .
While judgments of military necessity are
entitled to deference by the courts and while
temporary custody during wartime may be
justified in order properly to process those
who have been captured, the Executive has
had ample opportunity during the past five
years during which the detainees have been
held at Guantanamo Bay to determine who is
being held and for what reason.
The government maintains that a series of
World War II-era cases undercuts the
proposition that habeas review of uncharged
detainees requires a factual assessment. It
cites several cases in which courts have
refused to engage in factual review of the
findings of military tribunals imposing
sentences under the laws of war. There is
good reason to treat differently a petition by
an uncharged detainee-who could be held
indefinitely without even the prospect of a
trial or meaningful process-from that of a
convicted war criminal. For example, in
Yamashita, the prisoner petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus only after a trial before a
military tribunal where his six attorneys
defended against 286 government witnesses.
327 U.S. at 5, 66 S.Ct. 340. Quirin involved a
military commission, see 317 U.S. at 18-19,
63 S.Ct. 2, where the government presented
"overwhelming" proof that included
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confessions from the German saboteurs.
Pierce O'Donnell, In Time of War 152-53,
165-66, 189 (2005). In Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
at 766, 70 S.Ct. 936, the military tribunal
conducted a trial lasting months. By contrast,
the detainees have been charged with no
crimes, nor are charges pending. The
robustness of the review they have received to
date differs by orders of magnitude from that
of the military tribunal cases.
The Supreme Court in Rasul did not address
"whether and what further proceedings may
become necessary after respondents make
their responses to the merits of petitioners'
claims," 542 U.S. at 485. 124 S.Ct. 2686. The
detainees cannot rest on due process under the
Fifth Amendment. Although the district court
in Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355
F.Supp.2d at 454, made a contrary ruling, the
Supreme Court in Eisentrager held that the
Constitution does not afford rights to aliens in
this context. 339 U.S. at 770, 70 S.Ct. 936;
accord Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269,
110 S.Ct. 1056. Although in Rasul the Court
cast doubt on the continuing vitality of
Eisentrager, 542 U.S. at 475-79, 124 S.Ct.
2686, absent an explicit statement by the
Court that it intended to overrule
Eisentrager's constitutional holding, that
holding is binding on this court. Rather, the
process that is due inheres in the nature of the
writ and the inquiry it entails. The Court in
Rasul held that federal court jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is permitted for
habeas petitions filed by detainees at
Guantanamo, 542 U.S. at 485, 124 S.Ct.
2686; id. at 488, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (Kennedy. J.,
concurring in the judgment). and this result is
undisturbed because the MCA is void. So
long as the Executive can convince an
independent Article III habeas judge that it
has not acted unlawfully. it may continue to
detain those alien enemy combatants who
pose a continuing threat during the active
engagement of the United States in the war on
terror. See id. at 488. 124 S.Ct. 2686
(Kennedy. J.. concurring in the judgment); cf
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19, 124 S.Ct. 2633.
But it must make that showing and the
detainees must be allowed a meaningful
opportunity to respond.
Therefore, I would hold that on remand the
district courts shall follow the return and
traverse procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et
seq. In particular, upon application for a writ
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2242, the
district court shall issue an order to show
cause, whereupon "[t]he person to whom the
writ is or order is directed shall make a return
certifying the true cause of the detention," id.
§ 2243. So long as the government "puts forth
credible evidence that the [detainee] meets the
enemy-combatant criteria," Hamdi, 542 U.S.
at 533. 124 S.Ct. 2633, the district court must
accept the return as true "if not traversed" by
the person detained. Id. § 2248. The district
court may take evidence "orally or by
deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge,
by affidavit." Id. § 2246. The district court
may conduct discovery. Thereafter. "[t]he
[district] court shall summarily hear and
determine the facts, and dispose of the matter
as law and justice require." District courts are
well able to adjust these proceedings in light
of the government's significant interests in
guarding national security. as suggested in
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d
at 467, by use of protective orders and ex
parte and in camera review. id. at 471. The
procedural mechanisms employed in that
case. see, e.g., id. at 452 & n. 12. should be
employed again, as district courts must assure
the basic fairness of the habeas proceedings,
see generally id. at 468-78.
Accordingly. I respectfully dissent from the
judgment vacating the district courts,
decisions and dismissing these appeals for
lack of jurisdiction.
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"Justices to Weigh Detainee Rights"
The Washington Post
June 30, 2007
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court yesterday reversed itself
and agreed to consider whether detainees at
Guantanamo Bay have been unfairly barred
from the federal courts by the Bush
administration and Congress, a move that
may finally determine legal rights for
foreign-born terrorism suspects.
The case, which could become one of the
most important of the court's next term, will
address whether subjecting the detainees to
military commissions instead of allowing
them access to federal courts violates the
Constitution. In April, the court decided not
to hear an appeal from the detainees.
Yesterday's decision to change course and
hear the case was so unusual that lawyers
and court experts went to the archives to try
to find the last time it happened. The only
consensus was that it had been decades.
"The Supreme Court is going to decide the
simple question: Does the Constitution
protect the detainees?" said Georgetown
University law professor Neal K. Katyal,
who successfully argued a detainee case that
the court decided just a year ago. In that
case, the justices said President Bush did not
have authority to set up the military
tribunals that the administration thought
should hear the cases against the detainees.
In April, three justices-David H. Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer-said they were eager to hear the
appeals. which presented questions that
"deserve this courfs immediate attention." It
takes four justices to agree to take a case.
Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony M.
Kennedy said at the time that they would
continue to monitor the legal proceedings
involving the detainees. It takes five votes to
rehear a denial, so perhaps the two justices
concluded that they have seen enough. The
court's order is silent on which justices
agreed to hear the case.
The Bush administration had urged the court
not to take the appeals. "The grant of a
petition for rehearing from a denial of
certiorari is an extraordinary remedy,
warranted only where there have been
'intervening circumstances of a substantial
or controlling effect' or 'other substantial
grounds not previously presented,'
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement told the
court this month, adding that petitioners had
shown neither.
David Remes, a lawyer for some of the
detainees who brought the case, said the
court did not have to make the decision to
take the case now, "so what obviously
happened is the justices decided to confront
the issue sooner rather than later."
Department of Justice spokesman
said, "We are disappointed
decision, but are confident in
arguments and look forward to
them before the Court."
Erik Ablin
with the
our legal
presenting
The court's action comes as Congress and
the White House are looking for ways to
close the military prison at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and transfer the approximately
370 prisoners there to military prisons in the
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United States.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates
reiterated yesterday that he, Bush and
members of Congress all seek to close the
Cuba facility, which opened in January
2002. But he said legal obstacles stand in the
way.
"The biggest challenge is finding a statutory
basis for holding prisoners who should never
be released and who may or may not be able
to be put on trial" because, for example,
evidence against them involves sensitive
intelligence sources, Gates said at a
Pentagon news briefing.
Gates, who has pressed for closing the
facility since he came to office in December,
said that "people are working harder on the
problem."
Rep. James P. Moran Jr. (D-Va.) said
Democrats are considering a plan to cut
Guantanamo's budget by half, which would
keep the prison afloat for several more
months and give the administration time to
transfer the detainees. Moran said there is
concern among some lawmakers that an
immediate shutdown would put into
question the secure detention of the prison's
most dangerous inmates.
In a letter to Bush released yesterday, more
than 140 House members joined Moran in
calling for the facility's closure and said
detainees should be allowed to protest their
detentions in federal courts through habeas
corpus petitions.
The Supreme Court had twice ruled that
Guantanamo detainees had access to federal
courts to contest their incarcerations, but the
court also made clear that Congress could
weigh in on the issue. Lawmakers did so last
fall by approving the Military Commissions
Act, which stripped habeas corpus rights and
mandated special military trials for the
detainees.
In February, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
habeas corpus provision of the act, and that
case is what the court agreed to hear
yesterday.
The appeals court is also considering how to
handle the detainees' challenge of the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which
determine whether they are to be held as
enemy combatants.
The detainees' lawyers say the panel's use
of mostly classified evidence makes it
impossible for the suspects to defend
themselves. The lawyers filed an affidavit
last week with the court from an Army
reserve officer and lawyer who said the
tribunal's members rely on vague
information and are pressured into ruling
against the suspects.
Remes, the lawyer in the habeas corpus
case, said that the affidavit shows what a
"sham the process is" and that he believes it
played an important role in the justices'
decision to take the case now.
When the court hears the appeal sometime
in the fall, it will be the first time that Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. participates in a
case involving detainees. He recused himself
from an earlier case because he had been
involved in it while an appeals court judge.
The cases consolidated by the court are
Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. ES.
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"Justices Reject Appeals at
Guantanamo-For Now"
USA TODAY
April 3, 2007
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court refused on Monday to
hear appeals by Guantanamo prisoners held
for more than five years, in the latest action
in a long-running dispute over the Bush
administration's handling of terrorism
suspects and other foreign detainees.
Three dissenting justices, Stephen Breyer,
David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
wrote that the dispute over whether the
detainees have a basic right to challenge
their detention deserves "immediate
attention."
Two other justices, John Paul Stevens and
Anthony Kennedy, said in a separate
statement that "despite the obvious
importance of the issues raised in these
cases" the court should not intervene until
the detainees have finished other legal
routes.
Monday's action ensures that the Pentagon
will continue the ongoing round of special
military trials. the first of their kind since
World War II, for terrorism suspects picked
up after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Last June, the Supreme Court struck down
President Bush's plan for special military
tribunals for foreign prisoners at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base because it
violated the Geneva Conventions and the
U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Congress passed legislation in October to
remedy the flaws. and new tribunals recently
began in Cuba at the base long under U.S.
control.
Monday's cases, Bouniediene v. Bush and
Al Odah v. United States, did not involve
the merits of charges against any detainee or
questions about the lawfulness of the
military commission system as it has been
reconstituted. The question Monday was
whether Congress, in writing the new
statute, had erased the right of Guantanamo
prisoners to go before a U.S. judge to
challenge their basic detention.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled in February that the
writ of habeas corpus, long used by
American prisoners to obtain a fair hearing,
could not be invoked by the Guantanamo
detainees. Agreeing with the Bush
administration position, the lower court said
the newly enacted Military Commissions
Act had lifted U.S. judges' authority to hear
such cases.
Two sets of Guantanamo detainees
appealed, claiming that the lower court's
ruling conflicted with a 2004 high-court
decision that said foreigners at the base
could challenge their detention before a U.S.
judge.
In dissenting from Monday's order rejecting
the appeals, Breyer, joined by Souter and
Ginsburg, noted that the reasoning of the
2004 case could continue to apply He noted
that the court majority had said in the 2004
case of Rasul v. Bush that "application of the
habeas statute to persons detained at the
base is consistent with the historical reach of
the writ of habeas corpus." Breyer wrote that
the D.C. Circuit disregarded that reasoning.
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Stevens and Kennedy noted that the
rejection of the cases Monday "does not
constitute an expression of any opinion on
the merits" of the detainees' claims.
Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn., who has been a
vocal critic of Bush administration policy at
Guantanamo, called the court's action
"extremely regrettable" and said he would
continue to push for legislation to restore a
right of habeas corpus for the detainees.
Navy Cmdr. Jeffrey Gordon, a Defense
Department spokesman at Guantanamo, said
officials were pleased with the court action
and it will allow the current hearings "to
proceed without further delay."
Gordon said 385 prisoners are still at the
base, which since January 2002 has been
used to house foreigners picked up by U.S.
military forces searching for al-Qaeda
suspects. Fourteen of those men have been
designated "high-value detainees"
potentially facing terrorism charges.
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"Risking Testy Justices and Faulty Justice"
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Adam Liptak
What the Supreme Court
Usually.
says, goes.
But in a defiant decision two weeks ago, a
federal appeals court in Washington
conceded that it was ignoring parts of a 2004
Supreme Court decision on the rights of the
men held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
That can make the Supreme Court testy, and
it may help the detainees. Their lawyers plan
to ask the court today to hear the case.
The Supreme Court has already twice
reversed decisions about Guantanamo from
the same court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Both times, the Supreme Court ruled for the
detainees.
One more reversal will start to remind
people of the Supreme Court's cross
relationship with another appeals court. The
justices have repeatedly rebuked the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which hears appeals from inmates on
Texas's death row, for dragging its feet in
implementing Supreme Court decisions
meant to limit the death penalty.
The Guantanamo cases are harder. On the
one hand, the justices in the majority in the
2004 decision. Rasul v. Bush, certainly made
statements indicating how they would
decide a central issue in the new case,
Bouniediene v. Bush. But they made those
statements in asides. in what lawyers call
dicta.
They teach you in law school that only a
decision's holdings count. Holdings are the
narrow legal propositions on which
decisions turn. Everything else-all the
observations and footnotes and erudition-is
dicta.
But the Supreme Court may be different,
and judges on lower courts should probably
listen to it with particular care. The court,
after all, hears only a few cases, considers
them thoroughly and, in painstaking and
detailed decisions, often gives the lower
courts broad guidance.
The dissenting appeals judge in the 2-to-1
decision in Bounediene, Judith W. Rogers,
said her colleagues were thumbing their
noses at the Supreme Court. She said they
were "ignoring the Supreme Court's well-
considered and binding dictum" concerning
the historical roots and geographical scope
of the prisoners' basic rights, and she cited a
case from her own court that said that such
statements "generally must be treated as
authoritative."
The question sounds academic, if not
impenetrable, but it matters. The
Guantanamo docket has been moving with
geological speed. If another Supreme Court
reversal is inevitable, and if the court has
already signaled how it will rule in
Bounediene, it does the detainees a
profound disservice for appeals court judges
not to anticipate what the justices will do.
Almost three years ago, the Supreme Court
ruled in Rasul that the detainees possessed
an ancient and fundamental right-the right
to challenge the justness of their
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confinement in court by filing petitions for
writs of habeas corpus.
In the crucial aside in Rasul, Justice John
Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, said
this right was not just a result of a law
passed by Congress but was grounded in the
Constitution. "Application of the habeas
statute to persons detained at the base," he
wrote, "is consistent with the historical
reach of the writ of habeas corpus."
If that is right, a new law pushed by the
Bush administration, the Military
Commissions Act, could not have cut off the
detainees' rights to habeas corpus. In a
footnote, the appeals court majority
basically acknowledged that. But it ruled
that the Supreme Court's historical analysis
was wrong and that Justice Stevens's dictum
could be ignored. It upheld the new law.
Instead of looking to Rasul, which was
recent and concerned Guantanamo, the
appeals court justified its decision by citing
a 1950 Supreme Court decision, Johnson v.
Eisentrager. That case involved German
citizens convicted of war crimes in China
and held at a prison in Germany. The court
ruled that they had no right to habeas
corpus.
The court's reliance on Eisentrager was
curious. Both Justice Antonin Scalia,
dissenting in Rasul, and John Yoo, an
architect of the Bush administration's post-
9/11 legal strategy, have written that they
understood Rasul to have overruled
Eisentrager.
The Eisentrager court had, moreover, listed
six factors supporting its conclusion that the
German prisoners there had no habeas
rights, among them that they were citizens
of a country we had been at war with, that
they had been tried and convicted by
military tribunals and that they were
imprisoned outside the United States.
All of these points, Justice Stevens wrote in
Rasul, counted in favor of the Guantanamo
detainees.
"They are not nationals of countries at war
with the United States," Justice Stevens
wrote, "and they deny that they have
engaged in or plotted acts of aggression
against the United States; they have never
been afforded access to any tribunal, much
less charged with and convicted of
wrongdoing; and for more than two years
they have been imprisoned in territory over
which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control."
The detainees will ask the Supreme Court to
put Bounediene on a fast track, and it may
not be long until we hear from Justice
Stevens again.
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